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Abstract
Master’s Degree in Nuclear Engineering
Analysis of a Station Blackout sequence in a Boiling Water Reactor 3 Mark I with
MELCOR 2.1
by Eduard Dı´az Pescador
The fatal event occurred in Fukushima Daiichi NPP, focused the efforts of many R&D organiza-
tions towards the comprehensive study of the accident sequence, in order to better understand the
phenomenology which took place throughout the whole accident. The development of powerful
analytical tools and advanced plant models, underwent a surge since the event occurred in
Three Mile Island NPP. From Fukushima Daiichi accident on, plant modeling has been notably
enhanced, and furthermore it has pointed out the necessity of having tools capable to provide
emergency preparedness and emergency response against this kind of events. This necessity
has given rise to the creation of the European FASTNET project, within the Horizon 2020.
Nowadays, advanced plant modeling combined with powerful analytical tools, have allowed to
obtain more accurate results of severe accident at nuclear power reactors than at any time in the
past. FASTNET gathers all these previous efforts, in order to develop tools capable to obtain
fast response concerning source term evolution which eventually reaches the environment. The
foundation of FASTNET is a large database of accident scenarios. This project is enclosed in
the creation of the mentioned database for a Station Blackout scenario in a GE BWR 3 Mark
1 reactor design, by means of the analytical code MELCOR 2.1. Given the fact that source
term evolution cannot be conceived without thermal-hydraulic evolution, present work focuses
on both fields of study, and attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis of the accident for a
reactor technology quite similar as the one of the Unit 1 in Fukushima Daiichi.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 General overview
The research on severe accidents underwent an important boost since the event occurred in Three
Mile Island nuclear power plant. Nevertheless, it has turned into an utmost priority within the
nuclear safety field since the fatal event occurred in 2011 in Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power
station, where an earthquake and a subsequent tsunami damaged the facility leaving units 1 to 4
with a complete lack of both offsite and onsite AC power.
These facts led to the beginning of a SBO (Station Blackout) accident, event which originated a
large core degradation within several of those units in the nuclear facility, with a subsequent release
of radiation, which eventually reached the environment. One of the most severe consequences,
was a dramatic increase in the activities of harmful radioisotopes nearby the plant, such as those
of Cs, Xe and I, with the associated risk to the public due to exposure.
The accident occurred in Fukushima Daiichi NPP (Nuclear Power Plant) is defined as a severe
accident, which is characterized by conditions more severe than BDBA (Beyond Design Basis
Accidents) involving significant core degradation.
In order to achieve the development of tools devoted to the fast assessment of the source term in
severe accidents, it is fundamental to gather the efforts carried out by R&D institutions involved
in the study of this kind of accident. The FASTNET project was born to meet this objective,
and it groups together the main R&D nuclear safety institutions, mainly European but also
several from another continents.
1
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The Spanish research institution CIEMAT, takes part in this project by means of the Unit of
Nuclear Safety Research. The present work, developed within the Unit of Nuclear Safety is
enclosed in the first stage of the project, which, in simple terms, consists on the creation of a
scenarios database. The study of the SBO in this work is carried out in a General Electric design
BWR (Boiling Water Reactor) 3 with Mark I containment, a reactor with similar features to
the Unit 1 in Fukushima Daiichi. The final results on the source term evolution field are then
supplied to the FASTNET project.
1.2 Motivation
The accident of Fukushima Daiichi NPP triggered strong efforts of many R&D organizations in
order to study and obtain a better understanding of the phenomenology which took place during
each stage of the accident. CIEMAT took part in this task carrying out several studies and
producing several reports related to the topic [1], [2], [3], [4]. A shared idea by many nuclear
organizations, of the necessity of the creation of a predictive powerful tool, capable of providing
a fast and reliable response on the amounts of radiation which eventually reach the environment
in the accident, led to the creation of the European FASTNET project.
The main foundation of FASTNET is a large scenarios data base related to the current nuclear
reactor designs. In simple terms, this database will allow to know the extent to which source
term eventually leaks to the environment for each nuclear reactor design, to eventually provide a
emergency preparedness and a fast response in order to mitigate the consequences to the public.
Another purpose of the database creation, is to foster validation of the results among working
groups.
The present work contributes to the creation of the mentioned database, by means of source term
evolution data concerning GE BWR 3 Mark I containment type reactors for a SBO sequence.
Source term evolution is highly dependent on reactor thermal-hydraulic evolution throughout
the whole sequence. Therefore, this report especially focuses on thermal-hydraulic phenomena
and radionuclide evolution.
The objective of the present work is the analysis of a SBO sequence in a GE BWR 3 Mark I
containment type reactor. The starting point for the analysis was a previous study done for a
Fukushima-like SBO [4]. The plant model has been improved and updated, and the following
points have been developed:
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• Updating of the core model of the plant classical approach [5], following the Best Practice
Guidelines given in SOARCA [6], [7].
• Wetwell updating and study of the influence of several wetwell nodalizations during the
sequence.
• The study of thermal-hydraulic phenomena.
• The study of source term evolution.
• Monitoring of the most damaging radioisotopes in terms of activities in the environment.
The whole analysis of the sequence has been carried out by means of the severe accident code
MELCOR 2.1.
1.3 Methodology
The study of such a complex sequence, which involves so many fields of study (thermal-hydraulic,
source term, core degradation, etc), requires the use of powerful analytical tools. In this work the
chosen tool has been the severe accident code MELCOR 2.1 [6] [8]. Throughout the whole work,
this code has been used with the user’s interface SNAP (Symbolic Nuclear Analysis Package).
1.3.1 MELCOR 2.1
The SBO sequence has been simulated with MELCOR 2.1. In simple terms, it can be defined as a
fully integrated, engineering-level computer code that models the progression of severe accidents
in LWR (Light Water Reactors). It has been developed by SNL (Sandia National Laboratories)
for the USNRC (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission), and it is composed of a number
of modules, called packages, which model the important phenomena that will occur during severe
nuclear accidents. The thermal-hydraulic behavior in MELCOR is modeled with governing
equations comprising conservation equations of mass, momentum and energy.
In order to reproduce progression of severe accidents in the nuclear reactor some packages are
needed, among them it is worth pointing out the core package (COR), which models the core
region and the lower plenum in 2-D cylindrical geometry. It calculates thermal response of the
fuel rods and internal structures in the core and lower plenum, as well as the whole portion of
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the lower head directly below the core. The package also models the relocation of core and lower
plenum structural materials during melting, slumping and formation of molten pool and debris
bed, including failure of the reactor vessel and ejection of debris into the reactor cavity. Lower
head failure mechanisms such as penetration tube failure and creep rupture of the lower head
are modeled as well.
Energy transfer to and from the control volume hydrodynamics (CVH) package and the heat
structure (HS) package is calculated. All phenomena related to corium behavior during ex-vessel
stage, such as MCCI (Molten Core Concrete Interaction), is included in the cavity (CAV)
package. Control functions provide versatility and simplicity to the user when defining operation
of systems such as SRVs (Safety Relief Valves).
1.4 The FASTNET project
The European project FASNET [9] is funded by the Euratom Research and Training Programme
2014-2018, and it belongs to the Horizon 2020. It is being developed by a consortium of nuclear
organizations, among them the Spanish research institution Ciemat. Its main purpose can
be defined as the development of a tool for the fast and reliable prediction of severe accident
progression and anticipation of the source term of a nuclear accident, in all the operating nuclear
power plant concepts (PWR, BWR, VVER, CANDU).
To develop such a tool, FASTNET establishes a methodology including both deterministic and
probabilistic approaches. Just to give a background, the first one concerns the evaluation of the
source term in a reduced time in order to provide responses as soon as possible. To do so, the
analytical tool employed (e.g. PERSAN code) basically considers reduced models of the NPPs,
which include only those fundamental parameters to allow a quick assessment of the source
term. The probabilistic approach, allows mainly to obtain a global estimation of the source term
evolution based on databases of previously computed PSA (Probabilistic Safety Analysis).
The FASTNET project is structured in several packages that are interconnected. The packages
are shared and developed by the institutions belonging to the consortium, in such a way that
working teams from different organizations work together towards a common objective.
This work is enclosed within the first package (WP1) or Scenarios database. The main contribution
of the present work to the FASNET project, is to supply a database of source term evolution
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(release and transport of radionuclides). Provided the importance of having a scenarios database
which allows to perform, among others, validation of the obtained results, FASNET is gathering
a wide number of analysis for the operating NPP concepts.
The overall administrative and financial management is entirely carried out by the French
institution ISRN. The whole overview of the project, as well as detailed information of its scope,
are well described in the website of the project (www.fastnet-h2020.eu) [9].
Chapter 2
Plant Modeling
2.1 Plant Characteristics
The NPP employs a General electric design BWR 3 Mark I containment type with 1400 MWth.
The nuclear boiler assembly consists of the RPV containing the core structure, steam dryers,
fuel supports and control guide tubes. The reactor core is made up of 400 fuel assemblies and
97 control rod blades. As in all Mark I containments, the containment consists of two large
compartments; an inverted light-bulb (drywell) made out of stainless steel, which surrounds
the RPV and the recirculation loops, and a torus (wetwell), which is a suppression chamber
containing a large body of water called suppression pool. Drywell and wetwell are connected
through vent pipes and vacuum breakers. The most relevant parameters of the plant and the
core for the sequence of study are collected in Table 2.1.
6
Chapter 2. Plant Modeling 7
REACTOR
Thermal Power 1400 MWth
Nominal Vessel Pressure 70 bar
FUEL ELEMENTS
Fuel elements 400
Cladding Zry-2
Fuel UO2
Mass of fuel 80000 kg
Mass of Zircaloy 30000 kg
Channel Zry-4
CONTROL RODS
Number of Control Rods 97
Shape Cruciform
Material B4C
REACTOR VESSEL
Design Pressure 88 bar
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT
DW/WW design pressure 4.3 bar
Volume of SP water/air space 1800/3000 m3
Volume of DW 3300 m3
Table 2.1: Relevant parameters of the plant.
The primary containment structure is enclosed by the reactor building as it can be seen in Figure
2.1. The lowest floor is the building basement where the torus room is located. The highest floor
is the refueling bay.
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Figure 2.1: Mark I containment type.
2.1.1 Key systems
2.1.1.1 Isolation Condenser
The isolation condenser system is a safety-related system that allows core cooling when reactor
is isolated from turbine and condenser. It consists on a heat exchanger with two tube bundles,
each of them located in opposite sides inside a horizontal cylindrical water tank. It operates
by natural circulation, condensing the steam being produced in the RPV and returning the
resulting condensate to the vessel.
In order to initiate the operation of the IC, a motor-operated valve must be open (or, if DC power
is lost, a manual nitrogen-operated bypass valve). Steam then flows, under reactor pressure, to
the IC. The steam is routed to both condenser tube bundles where it is condensed by the cooler
water in the shell side of the condenser.
Makeup water is normally added from the demineralized water makeup system but it can be
supplied from the condensate storage tank or the fire protection system. To maintain pressure
below limits within shell side of IC, vents to the environment from the shell side are implemented.
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In the plant object of study, the IC has a total heat extraction capacity of 100 MW.
2.1.1.2 Safety Relief Valves
The safety/relief valves are dual-function valves installed on the main steam line discharging
directly to the pressure suppression pool. The relief function provides power-actuated valve
opening to depressurize the reactor primary system. The safety function provides protection
against over-pressure transients in the RCS (Reactor Cooling System). The valves are sized to
accommodate the most severe of the following two pressurization transient cases determined by
analysis:
• Turbine trip from turbine design power, failure of direct scram on turbine stop valve
closure, failure of the steam bypass system, and reactor scrams from an indirect scram.
• Closure of all main steam line isolation valves, failure of direct scram based on valve
position switches and reactor scrams from an indirect scram.
For the pressure-relief function, the valves are power-actuated manually from the control room
or power-actuated automatically upon high pressure. In the latter, valves open sequentially
depending on several pressure setpoints and close when primary pressure falls below established
pressure setpoints, following a hysteresis cycle.
In the NPP there are a total of 6 SRVs.
2.2 Station Blackout
The SBO is a severe accident which challenges integrity of first safety barrier of the defense in
depth [10], implying damage and subsequent degradation of the core. It is one of the largest
contributors to CDF (Core Damage Frequency) at BWRs. The most frequent initiators for
this kind of accidents are large seismic events or internal fires or floods. Damage caused by the
initiator, is assumed to result in a total loss of both onsite and offsite AC power [6].
Reactor scram, reactor isolation and containment isolation immediately follow the initiating
event. Neither active AC nor DC power is necessary for these safety functions to occur.
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ECCSs (Emergency Core Cooling Systems) eventually remain unavailable due to the lack AC
power. As a result, reactor relies only on two safety related systems that do not need supply of
power to work:
• Isolation condenser (IC)
• Safety Relief Valves (SRVs)
Taking into account the systems that are still available to perform their design functions, IC
will extract the decay heat of the core, delaying core uncovery, keeping the RPV cooled until
IC water inventory gets depleted. Once it gets depleted, water present in the RPV will start
evaporating thus increasing the pressure within the vessel and triggering the core heat up. At this
point, pressure in the RPV will undergo a sharp increase, thus reaching the established pressure
set-points and enabling the SRVs actuation, which will open transferring steam (and decreasing
pressure within RPV) from the RPV to the suppression pool, where it will be condensed.
Water inventory will decrease progressively triggering the beginning of core degradation due to
the almost completely lack of cooling in the core (steam is still a weak source of core cooling).
Core degradation throughout the accident is produced mainly due to cladding oxidation with the
steam originated from the decay heat of the core. This reaction challenges the acceptance criteria
limits established in 10 CFR 50 USNRC and not only oxidizes the cladding (thus altering its
composition), but also generates a significant amount of energy which accelerates the degradation
of the fuel assembly. The configuration and integrity of the cladding rod change as the cladding
temperature increases. First, ballooning and rupture of the cladding may occur due to excessive
internal pressure in the fuel rods. If cladding heat-up continues, the metallic part of the cladding
will melt. Progressively, as temperature keeps increasing in the core, liquefaction temperatures
for ZrO2/UO2 interactions (eutectic) are reached and core degraded materials (zircaloy, fuel,
stainless steel) relocates in lower levels. Relocated material may freeze on the outside surface of
the cladding or may collapse into the core plate.
The chemical reaction defining the oxidation of the cladding is as follows:
Zr + 2H2O → ZrO2 + 2H2 + 331(kJ/kg) (2.1)
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At shut-down, a small fraction of fission products (made up by volatile species) accumulated
in the fuel rod gap during operation of the reactor, are released from the core early in-vessel
through diffusion. Nevertheless, as soon as temperature threshold of 1500 K is reached and
hydrogen and chemical heat generation occurs, fuel rods are degraded enough to allow the release
from the fuel of important amounts of fission products. Radionuclides are propagated all over
the RPV and reach the PCV through the SRVs.
2.3 Hypothesis and Approximations
2.3.1 Core Nodalization
The core is split into 12 axial nodes, distributed between the lower plenum and the active core.
Radially, the core is described by 3 radial rings whereas the lower plenum is described by 4
radial rings, thus including the region below the downcomer. A visual representation of the core
nodalization is shown in Figure 2.2a.
A core updating from the classical approach [5], has been carried out in order to better reproduce
the phenomena occurred in the core, following the BPG’s given in SOARCA [6], [7]. This
updating has consisted mainly on the introduction of the following enhancements:
• Eutectic model: Eutectics have been modeled by capturing their effect through setting
variable thresholds. By doing so, lower liquefaction temperatures for ZrO2/UO2 and
B4C/SS interaction are used (Table 2.2).
Material No Eutectic Eutectic
ZrO2 2990 K 2800 K
UO2 3113 K 2800 K
B4C 2600 K 1700 K
Table 2.2: Melting temperatures [8].
• Fuel rod damage model: The fuel rod damage model, which accounts for the thermo-
mechanical weakening of the oxide shells and their failure. This model allows the fuel to
reach a maximum temperature of 2600 K, which is 513 K below the 3113 K of the pure
UO2 melting temperature (reached by the no rod damage model).
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• Horizontal flow model: The horizontal flow model allows the channel to communicate
with the bypass when the canister fails by opening flow paths.
• Support and non-support structures model: A model to define the distribution of
support and non-support structures within the axial and radial levels in the lower plenum,
in order to enhance the debris collapsing behavior.
• Shroud model: Melting of the core shroud and subsequent release of non-radioactive
gases is also enabled in the present model.
(a) Core nodalization (b) Thermal-hydraulic nodalization [4]
Figure 2.2: RPV modeling
2.3.2 Thermal-hydraulic nodalization
The entire NPP has been modeled. Large components and buildings, like RPV, drywell, wetwell
and reactor building have been split into nodes (control volumes). Safety related systems (IC and
SRVs) have been modeled according to their performance specifications. A visual representation
of the whole plant nodalization is shown in Figure 2.5.
The RPV has been split into 6 interconnected control volumes: lower plenum, channel, bypass,
downcomer, shroud and steam dome. A visual representation of RPV configuration is shown in
Figure 2.2b. This meshing is representative of the classical approach of one single node for the
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channel and another for the bypass [6]. RPV as a whole includes 4 flow paths; 1 for the SRVs, 1
for the vessel breach and 2 representing leakages to the drywell. FL 370 represents the leakage
due to recirculation pumps seals failure, whereas FL 371 models leakages through lower head
penetrations and guide tubes.
Reactor building has been nodalized with a total of 10 compartments. Connections between
DW/WW and RB, RB and environment (i.e., leaks) and between DW/WW and environment
(i.e., venting) have been modeled through valve controlled flow-paths depending upon pressure
levels. Drywell and wetwell are connected, as are the reactor building and the refueling bay.
Thus the pressures in the drywell and wetwell are always in equilibrium, as are those in the
reactor building and refueling bay.
In the progression of a SBO sequence in a BWR3 Mark I containment type reactor, the NPP
strongly relies on the wetwell as a heat and mass sink. It is a system that plays a fundamental
role during the sequence by receiving and condensing a significant amount of steam coming from
the SRVs (in the in-vessel phase). In order to study the influence of the nodalization of this
system in the progression of the accident, the wetwell has been modeled with two configurations:
by considering it as a single node, and by splitting it into 8 circumferential nodes in order to
study the azimuthal stratification.
The nodalization of the plant is affected by PCV configuration, particularly the wetwell nodaliza-
tion with either 1 or 8 nodes. Drywell nodalization is exactly the same for the 2 configurations.
It is modeled through a single control volume, which surrounds the RPV and includes the cavity.
The whole plant model has a total of 20 and 34 control volumes for the two different wetwell
configurations. Concerning the connections between control volumes, 35 and 66 flow paths are
modeled, for the configurations of 1 and 8 WW nodes, respectively.
2.3.2.1 Wetwell Nodalization
• Single node. The entire wetwell volume has been considered one node, with the sup-
pression pool (40 % of the total WW volume) as the liquid phase and the gas over the
pool surface as the gas phase. Vents between DW/WW have been also modeled as 1
node with two flow paths linking drywell and wetwell; the flow paths have been directed
ad-hoc DW-vent and vent-WW (in-pool injection with an initial submergence of about 1
m). Vacuum breakers have been defined as 1 WW to DW valve-controlled flow path (valve
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opens when pressure difference is over 3.5 kPa roughly), and SRVs are modeled as well as
valve-controlled flow path between steam dome and wetwell.
• Eight circumferential nodes. The WW has been split according to DW/WW vents
plant configuration (Figure 2.6), that is, since NPP has 8 vents pipes, wetwell volume has
been divided in 8 identical nodes, among which the only differences are their azimuthal
location and the fact that SRVs discharge in some of them, particularly in WW nodes 1, 4
and 7 (Figure 2.7). Modeling of vacuum breakers has been carried out exactly in the same
way as in the single node configuration but with 8 flow paths rather than one, as well as
vents, reproduced with 8 control volumes connected with DW/WW with 16 flow paths (8
flow paths connecting vents with DW and 8 with the WW). The node-to-node connections
have been defined through a single flow path which covers the entire torus cross section
and allows both phases move at different velocities and exchange momentum. The flow
path lengths have been approximated as the center-to-center distance.
In all the cases, flow paths have been defined through the default values recommended by [8], [11].
Each wetwell node includes two heat structures with a ”pipe-like HS element”: one simulates the
lower part of WW torus and it is completely submerged; the other accounts for the dry section
of the torus plus the internal structures and it is partially submerged. It is important to note
that the latter entails a ”heat bridge” between gas and water phases in the node” [1].
2.3.2.2 Safety systems
The SRVs performance through a pressure hysteresis cycle has been modeled by valve flow paths
between the RPV and the suppression pool (with 2 m of submergence). 6 SRVs have been
modeled and their setpoints are defined through a hysteresis control function (Figure 2.3), so
that they would open sequentially if pressure keeps on rising. Each SRV pipe, connecting RPV
steam dome and wetwell, discharges steam and non-condensible gases either in a single node
when modeled with one node configuration or in a different azimuthal location when modeled
through 8 nodes.
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Figure 2.3: SRVs hysteresis control function.
SRVs characteristics, such as opening and closure pressures points, as well as discharging location
within the wetwell are collected in Table 2.3. Azimuthal location of each node is depicted in
Figure 2.7.
Valve No. Bank No. Opening P [MPa] Closing P [MPa] Wetwell discharging location
1 1 7.37 7.17 Node 1 (45o)
2 2 7.44 7.24 Node 4 (180o)
3 3 7.51 7.31 Node 7 (315o)
4 1 7.86 7.47 Node 1 (45o)
5 2 7.86 7.47 Node 4 (180o)
6 3 7.86 7.47 Node 7 (315o)
Table 2.3: Safety relief valves characteristics.
On the other hand, a single IC has been modeled with a total capacity of 100 MW within the
generic NPP. As IC performance preserves the total water inventory in the RPV, the IC model
has been based on an enthalpy withdrawal from the vessel: once the IC starts, steam latent heat
is removed from the RPV according to an IC efficiency that is a function of the RPV pressure
[6],[7]. The IC comes into operation when RPV pressure reaches 7.3 MPa and it stops under
any of the following conditions: in-dome steam mass fraction lower than 0.5, steam temperature
higher than 20 K over saturation or water level in the secondary side of heat exchanger below
0.8 m from the bottom of the component.
2.3.2.3 Cavity
The cavity is modeled as a single unit (single volume) in the pedestal. Therefore, molten materials
fall in and remain within the reactor pedestal boundaries once vessel breach takes place. No
corium mass transfer is allowed from the cavity to another control volume in this single cavity
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model. Furthermore, MELCOR models all materials within the cavity as a single layer, that is,
it assumes a perfect mixture of the layers made up of molten materials (e.g.oxidic and metallic
layers).
The cavity of the NPP in this project makes use of a limestone/sand concrete type, whose
composition is depicted in Table 2.4.
Material Mass fraction
AL2O3 0.04
CAO 0.3
CO2 0.2
SIO2 0.36
H2OEV AP 0.03
H2OCHEM 0.02
FE2O3 0.015
Table 2.4: Concrete composition.
To end up with the cavity, main characteristics for Molten Core Concrete Interaction are collected
in Table 2.5.
Variable Value
Ablation temperature (K) 1500
Solidus temperature (K) 1450
Liquidus temperature (K) 1670
Initial temperature (K) 300
Concrete density (kg/m3) 2450
Table 2.5: MCCI modeling parameters.
2.3.2.4 Failure modes
Concerning the RPV, the vessel breach is simulated with a flow path, whose opening section
depends on the number of penetrations failed in the lower head.
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Concerning the PCV, in the drywell there are two types of failures modeled; a seal failure
in the vent line bellows due to high temperature (T>584 K), and a head flange seals failure
resulting from moderate pressure (P>0.59 MPa), combined with high temperatures (T> 644
K). In this failure mode, the temperature degrades the seals first, then the moderate pressure
lifts the head from the drywell and leakage can occur. The actual flow area available for leakage
through this path is a function of the drywell pressure. Once the seals are degraded by high
temperature, leakage will occur even if the temperature of the seals drops below the stated
degrading temperature.
The expansion bellows are used in containment penetrations to mitigate the effects of differential
movements between the penetration pipe and the containment shell, as well as to soften the
connection between parts of the connection structure. In the NPP, there are bellows mounted
along the vent and vacuum breaker lines, as shown in Figure 2.4. High temperatures degrade
the vent line bellows allowing the leakage to the torus room. For both drywell failure modes, the
failure area is computed by means of the whole perimeter of the component (either drywell head
or bellow), and the deviation length respect its original position [12].
Figure 2.4: Bellows position.
Concerning the wetwell, there is a containment venting with the environment, which is modeled
through a vent controlled flow path opening whenever the venting threshold is surpassed (P>0.47
MPa), and closes when containment is completely depressurized. The area of the containment
venting is representative of the cross section of the venting pipe. Additionally, there is a failure
owing to overpressure (P>0.67 MPa) connecting wetwell and torus room. After containment
failure, a path from the wetwell to the torus room, in the basement of the reactor building,
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is established (valve controlled flow path). The torus room would then leak into the reactor
building, and from there into the environment. Nevertheless, this failure mode never takes place
since containment venting does not allow to reach the pressure threshold of the overpressure
failure.
Furthermore, there is a blowout panel on the roof of the reactor building located in the refueling
bay, which fails when the pressure difference between the environment and the refuel bay is 1.6
kPa (reactor building overpressure). A summary of containment failure modes is shown in Table
2.6.
Containment failure mode Failure area [m2] Failure Threshold From To
Seals failure 1.0 · 10−3 584 K Drywell Torus Room
Head flange 3.36 · 10−3 0.59 MPa, 644 K Drywell RWC Room
Containment venting 0.0323 0.47MPa Wetwell Environment
Overpressure failure 0.53 0.67 MPa Wetwell Torus Room
Table 2.6: Failure modes.
Figure 2.5: Thermal-hydraulic plant modeling.
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Figure 2.6: PCV DW/WW vents configuration
[13] Figure 2.7: Azimuthal nodalization 8 nodes
Finally, a set of parametric cases were run in order to assess the effect of preventing the water
layer beneath the quenchers from any kind of exchange with the rest of the water (the so-called
axial stratification). The fraction of water removed from the pool represents one third of the
total water inventory within the suppression pool . All in all, in the present report there are 4
cases of study:
1. Reference case with the wetwell modeled with 1 node (case 1n).
2. Parametric case Axial stratification with the wetwell modeled with 1 node (case AS 1n).
3. Parametric case with the wetwell modeled with 8 azimuthal nodes (case 8n).
4. Parametric case Axial stratification with the wetwell modeled with 8 azimuthal nodes (case
AS 8n).
Chapter 3
Analysis of the results
This chapter is focused on the analysis of the results obtained throughout the SBO sequence,
mainly in terms of thermal-hydraulic and fission products behavior. The chapter is arranged
according to accidental phases, that is, in-vessel and ex-vessel phases. The legend of the figures
during the chapter is as follows:
• 1n: Reference case with the wetwell modeled with 1 node .
• AS 1n: Parametric case Axial stratification with the wetwell modeled with 1 node.
• 8n: Parametric case with the wetwell modeled with 8 azimuthal nodes.
• AS 8n: Parametric case Axial stratification with the wetwell modeled with 8 azimuthal
nodes.
The study of fission products behavior is focused only in the case which implies worst conditions
compared to the rest of the cases, which is the case AS 8n. Despite the fact that each one of
the cases implies severe core degradation conditions and radionuclide release, the whole study
of each case is beyond the scope of this work. As a conservative approach, the one with more
unfavorable conditions has been chosen to carry out this study.
An overall view of the accident progression is provided in table 3.1, which shows the timing of
the key events for the 4 cases of study. Accident progression follows the same pattern for all
cases till the end of core uncovery, where an important deviation appears in case 1n, in which
a fraction of degraded fuel rods as well as materials present in the core fall into lower plenum
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almost 3 h earlier than the rest of the cases. This deviation has its origins in mass flow rates
through the core. Particularly, in the steam mass flow rate through the core channel in case 1n,
which present lower values than the rest of the cases. As a result, heat extraction capability
provided by the steam is lower in this case, fact that entails higher temperatures in the core.
Higher temperatures entail higher cladding oxidation rates and a large amount of H2 and energy
is generated from oxidation reaction. Integrity of the cladding is challenged earlier, and degraded
mass falls earlier into core plate, thus provoking an early failure of core plate by yielding and the
subsequent fall into lower plenum. This deviation does not entail that with less water inventory
in the suppression pool, accident evolves with longer timings in core plate failure. This fact shows
the sensitivity of the code against slight differences in equations’ boundary conditions, which
can trigger different behaviors. A comprehensive description of this behavior and a comparison
with the rest of the cases is provided in section 3.1.2 Steam mass flow rates through the core.
key event case 1n case AS 1n case 8n case AS 8n
IC working period (h) 0-2.57 0-2.55 0-2.48 0-2.57
SRVs working period (h) 3.17-14.24 3.15-13.28 3.21-13.81 3.19-14.65
Core uncovery (h) 5.2-6.79 5.16-6.8 5.19-6.82 5.2-6.81
Fuel drop to lower plenum (h) 10.3 13.12 13.58 13.5
Dry RPV (h) 11.86 13.28 13.81 14.74
Vessel breach (h) 14.65 13.28 13.81 15.26
Table 3.1: Timing of key events.
3.1 In-Vessel phase
This phase gathers all phenomena occurred previous to the vessel breach. As soon as reactor
shuts down, power generated in the core is dramatically reduced, from nominal to decay heat
power. Decay heat from the core begins heating the water which tends to evaporate, thus
increasing the pressure in the RPV and triggering actuation of Isolation Condenser. Isolation
condenser shell side absorbs the phase change enthalpy from RPV inventory, and decreases both
pressure and water temperature within the RPV. As soon as isolation condenser shell side gets
depleted, water evaporation rate raises (since 100 MW of heat extraction capability are not
available anymore), thus increasing pressure and triggering now the actuation of the SRVs.
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SRVs transfer steam from the RPV to the wetwell, thus decreasing pressure inside the vessel, as
well as RPV water inventory. This entails a unfavorable consequence; core starts uncovering
and heat extraction capability is notably reduced. Consequently, core starts heating up, thus
triggering chemical oxidation of zicaloy, present in the cladding rod, in contact with steam.
Oxidation is an exothermic reaction which adds an additional and more powerful heat source to
the decay heat, which is chemical heat. As soon as the core temperature threshold of 1500 K is
reached, oxidation reaction undergoes a surge and a significant amount of H2 and chemical heat
is released. As a result, core temperature increases dramatically, due to the lack of significant
cooling (steam is still a weak source of cooling), thus challenging cladding integrity and core is
notably degraded. Throughout this phase, radionuclides are released from the core and spread
all over the RPV and PCV through the SRVs.
3.1.1 Themal-hydraulic evolution
Figure 3.1 displays RPV pressure evolution throughout the whole time domain, that is 48
hours. First 2.5 hours after the beginning of the SBO, pressure evolution is dominated by the
IC actuation and pressure is kept below nominal pressure. Once IC gets depleted, pressure
undergoes a sharp increase till reaching the setpoints of the SRVs. From then on, SRVs are the
main responsible of keeping pressure below design limits within the RPV. SRVs open sequentially
according to their setpoints (Table 2.3). Eventually, core debris and molten pool produced
during core degradation (from 7.5 h on) in the active core region reach the lower plenum and
lower head penetrations met their temperature failure criterion (1275 K), due to heat transfer
from the contact with hot materials. When vessel breach takes place the RPV pressure drops
suddenly to the PCV pressure.
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Figure 3.1: RPV pressure.
Pressure evolution in PCV, depicted in Figure 3.2 strongly depends on what occurs within
the RPV. SRVs connect the RPV with the PCV through the wetwell. Moreover, heat transfer
between the RPV walls and the drywell is assumed by imposing a heat transfer coefficient
between them. First 7.5 hours from the beginning of the accident pressure increases softly since
steam injected in the suppression pool through the SRVs is being condensed, thus increasing PCV
temperature. Additionally, there is heat transfer from the RPV walls to the PCV. At around
7.5 h, core temperature reaches 1500 K and triggers massive H2 generation through cladding
oxidation, which is injected in the suppression pool. Nevertheless, since H2 is a non condensible
gas, it escapes the pool retention capability thus increasing dramatically PCV pressure. Once H2
generation is notably reduced, mainly steam and a minor fraction of H2 are directed towards the
suppression pool. From then on, pressure increases at a lower rate due to steam condensation in
the suppression pool, till a second cladding oxidation takes place and an important amount of H2
is generated within the RPV and subsequently transported to the PCV through the SRVs, fact
that entails a sharp increase in pressure. Second cladding oxidation, ends up with degraded core
materials falling first in the core plate, and then into the lower plenum. Eventually, PCV pressure
dramatically increases due to lower head penetrations failure and the subsequent transfer of
highly energetic gases from RPV to PCV through the vessel breach. As a result, pressure within
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the PCV reaches the wetwell venting opening pressure, fact that originates a sudden reduction
of PCV pressure.
Figure 3.2: Containment pressure.
As it can be extracted from Figure 3.3, which depicts drywell temperature evolution, temperature
increases mildly throughout time until vessel breach takes place, time where a temperature peak
takes place due to a sudden transfer of highly energetic gases from the RPV. Previous to vessel
breach, temperature slope shows two regions, the region pre-hydrogen generation (before 7.5 h)
and the region post-hydrogen generation (after 7.5 h), being the latter slightly higher.
According to PCV temperature evolution, it can be appreciated a deviation of temperature
for case 1n compared to the rest of the cases in the post-hydrogen generation region, at 10.3 h.
At that time, a fraction of fuel materials fall from the active core into the lower plenum, thus
reducing the overall temperature in the active core region, especially in the external core radial
ring. As a result, heat transfer from the active core region to the RPV walls is notably reduced
compared to the rest of the cases. Hence, heat transfer from the RPV walls to the drywell is
lesser in this case.
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Figure 3.3: Drywell temperature.
Level of water in the vessel throughout the sequence provides a general overview of the progression
of the accident. Figure 3.4 depicts water level in RPV for the 4 cases of study. The water level
drops below the TAF (Top of Active Fuel) at about 5.2 h, and from then on, it decreases rapidly
until reaching the region below the core plate (lower plenum). It drops below the BAF (Bottom
of Active Fuel) at about 6.8 h. According to water level within the RPV, progression of core
uncovery is quite similar for all cases of study.
Once water level drops below the BAF and is located in the lower plenum, the level decreases
at a slower rate since water is no longer in contact with fuel. As a result, in the lower plenum
there is less heat transfer to the water and water evaporation rate slows down. Due to the lack
of water in the active core region, heat extraction capability in this region is weak. Chemical
heat (generated by oxidation reaction), as well as decay heat, dramatically increase temperature
in the core thus challenging integrity of the cladding. This fact leads to the fall of degraded
materials first to the core plate.
When core debris and molten materials collapse from the core plate into lower plenum, there
is a slight peak in water level, caused by the volume occupied by these materials in the lower
plenum. Hence water is displaced upwards. Right after the fall, there is a sharp decrease in the
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water level due to a major heat transfer from the recently incorporated hot materials to the
water. This results in a fast evaporation of the water still present in the lower plenum.
The timing difference between case 1n and the rest of the cases is explained by means of steam
mass flow rates through the core, as commented in the beginning of the chapter and in following
subsection 3.1.2 Steam mass flow rates through the core. On the other hand, there are visible
differences in the water level behavior between cases 1n, AS 8n and cases AS 1n, 8n. These
behavior differences arise from the amount of materials falling into the lower plenum. The amount
of materials collapsed into the lower plenum is far higher for the latter two. This originates a
higher steam flashing, the water tends to evaporate way more faster, and the temperature in the
penetrations exceeds the failure temperature in a lesser time, thus originating earlier the vessel
breach.
Figure 3.4: Core level.
In-vessel zircaloy oxidation, and in a lesser extent stainless steel oxidation, generate large amounts
of H2 and energy as chemical heat. The latter, combined with eutectic formation in the cladding
rod as well as decay heat, determines the damage to fuel rod integrity, and strongly affects
overall thermal-hydraulic evolution. Oxidation reaction depends mainly on two factors; steam
mass flow rates through the core and local temperature. Figure 3.5 shows cumulative hydrogen
generation in the 4 cases of study. This generation includes H2 from zircaloy, stainless steel and
B4C oxidation.
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At around 7.5 h, temperatures in the core reach 1500 K and H2 generation increases dramatically,
until its generation is suddenly reduced due to reduction of steam flows through the core. This
reduction of flows arise from the fact that during oxidation reaction a high amount of energy
has been generated, thus degrading the cladding rod, and core materials have fallen onto the
core plate thus originating flow blockages. H2 generation in this phase is slightly larger for case
1n due to higher steam mass flow rates through the core channel.
From then on, materials in the core plate block a significant fraction of the flow of steam coming
from the lower plenum. It is worth noting that steam is being generated in the lower plenum
now at a lower rate than when it was generated in the active core region , since heat transfer
there is notably lesser. As a result of core degradation during first oxidation reaction stage
(7.5 h), the cannister box fails, and a path between the core channel region and the bypass
region (simulating in-between canister spacing and in-assembly water rods) is established. Since
only a small fraction of steam generated in the lower plenum reaches the active core region,
due to the blockages, pressure within RPV reaches a semi steady state, fact that originates a
stable actuation of SRVs (pressure remains constant and SRVs do not open and close constantly
anymore). As a result, water steam leaving the RPV through the SRVs is notably reduced. A
steam convective loop is established within the active core region. The mass flow rate of steam
through the convective loop in the channel, combined with temperatures around 1500 k, triggers
again a dramatic increase in H2 generation from oxidation reaction at around 12.5 h. This
hydrogen generation is accompanied by a high generation of energy as chemical heat. The extent
to which hydrogen and energy are produced depend upon the steam mass flow rates through the
channel.
Early ex-vessel, as soon as core debris and molten materials are ejected from the lower plenum
to the cavity (about 15 h), they reach the water accumulated in the cavity and immediately
evaporates it through heat transfer. Water accumulated in the cavity, comes from leaks in the
RCS, due to recirculation pumps seals failure (FL 370) and lower head penetrations and guide
tubes (FL 371). Steam generated in the cavity enters the RPV through the vessel breach and
reaches a small fraction of intact fuel (located in the third radial ring above the TAF), which
undergoes another oxidation.
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Figure 3.5: Hydrogen generation in the vessel.
Within the wetwell, suppression pool is the main responsible of absorbing the heat coming from
the SRVs through high energetic gases. One of the main variables to take into account in the
pool is the temperature, which is depicted in Figure 3.6, for the cases with the wetwell modeled
with single node, that is cases 1n, AS 1n. Temperature starts increasing as soon as SRVs inject
steam from RPV. This steam is condensed and the released latent heat is absorbed by the water.
This remains so for hours until H2 injection, which entails a temperature increase slowing down
because the amount of steam entering the pool decreases (a fraction of steam turns into hydrogen
within the RPV due mainly to zircaloy oxidation by steam). Once H2 coming from the SRVs
decreases, water temperature rises again due to an increase in steam injection till vessel breach,
and subsequent SRVs closure. In both cases pool temperature remains always below saturation
(dashed red line), being case AS 1n closer to saturation temperature since water inventory is
lower than case 1n.
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Figure 3.6: Suppression Pool temperatures single node configuration.
When wetwell is meshed into 8 identical azimuthal nodes linked to each other by 1 flow path, the
water in the nodes where the open SRV discharges (Table 2.3), heats up much faster than the
other nodes, especially for the node where SRVs with lower set-points discharge (node WW1).
Figure 3.7 depicts temperature evolution in case 8n. Temperature in the suppression pool
starts increasing as soon as SRVs discharge steam coming from the RPV. From then on, water
temperature in node WW1 (the one in which the SRV with lowest pressure set-point discharges)
increases dramatically due to condensation of steam, and absorption of its latent heat by the
water, until reaching water saturation temperature. During this period, temperature of the
wetwell nodes has grown according to their proximity to WW1 (especially for WW2 and WW8).
As soon as saturation temperature is reached in wetwell node WW1, a significant fraction of
steam entering the suppression pool is released to the drywell, through the vent connecting WW1
with the drywell. This steam, is redirected from the drywell to the set of vents connecting the
drywell with the several nodes of the wetwell (Figure 2.6). As a result, the gas pushes the water
within the different nodes leading to an enhancement of liquid mass exchange between nodes.
Hence, the sudden drop of WW1 water temperature and the sudden increase in the temperature
of the water in the rest of the wetwell nodes. After the dramatic drop in water temperature in
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node WW1 there is a slight increase in water temperature due to steam injection. Nevertheless,
this increase is mitigated by the injection of H2 at about 6 h.
H2 injection entails an increase in the wetwell pressure forcing opening of vacuum breakers, thus
releasing pressure to the drywell. This increase in pressure along with gas coming from the vents
provokes again an enhancement of liquid mass exchange between nodes and a semi steady state
is reached until 13.8 h, moment when there is a sharp increase in water temperature due to
steam injection coming from the flashing generated by debris collapse to lower plenum. Pool
temperature ends up 25 k below saturation.
Figure 3.7: Suppression Pool temperatures 8 node configuration .
Suppression pool temperature in case AS 8n slightly differs from case 8n, as shown in Figure 3.8.
WW1 water heating up occurs faster due to the lack of heat absorption of water layer beneath
the SRVs injection. Again, when water temperature in node WW1 reaches saturation, a fraction
of steam coming from the SRVs leaks the suppression pool and reaches the drywell through the
vents. From the drywell, it is distributed trough the set of vents connecting the drywell with
the 8 azimuthal nodes, thus enhancing the liquid mass exchange between nodes. As a result,
suppression pool temperature in all nodes tends to equalize until steam coming from the SRVs
again provokes another increase in the pool water temperature, in this case much higher than
case 8n due to a lesser water inventory, which is mitigated by injection of H2 coming from the
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RPV. Hydrogen injection forces opening of vacuum breakers and water reaches a semi steady
state until steam injection from the SRVs due to flashing in the LP, at 13.9 h. In this case water
remains closer to saturation temperature, at 5 K.
Figure 3.8: Suppression Pool temperature 8 nodes axial stratification.
In Figures 3.9a and 3.9b are depicted cumulative steam injections for SRVs 1 and SRVs 2 and 3,
respectively. As it can be appreciated from both figures, the vast majority of the steam generated
in the RPV is directed to the suppression pool via the SRV 1. Hence the major role of the
wetwell node WW1 (the one receiving injection from SRV 1), during the sequence by condensing
that steam, in the cases with the wetwell modeled with 8 nodes. In case 8n pressure set-points
of SRV 3 are not reached, and this bank does not play any role during the sequence. The cases
in which the wetwell is modeled as a single node, only receive injection through the SRV 1.
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(a) SRVs 1 (b) SRVs 2 and 3
Figure 3.9: H2O vapor through SRVs
A similar explanation can be provided about H2 injection in all the cases of study. Major part of
H2 comes from SRV 1, the one with the lowest pressure set-points. Therefore, main phenomena
occurred in the wetwell modeled with 8 nodes takes place in WW1, the node which receives
injection from SRV 1. Injections are depicted in figures 3.10a and 3.10b, for SRVs 1 and SRVs 2
and 3, respectively. Hydrogen is always transported through the SRVs together with a fraction
of steam.
(a) SRVs 1 (b) SRVs 2 and 3
Figure 3.10: H2 through SRVs
3.1.2 Steam mass flow rates through the core
This section explains the steam mass flow rates through the channel and their influence in the
core degradation phenomena throughout the sequence, particularly focusing on the differences
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between case 1n and the other cases.
As explained in the section above, RPV water level shows a similar behavior for all the cases of
study till water reaches the lower plenum. At 7.5 h, core reaches 1500 K and larger amounts
of H2, as well as a high amount of energy, released as chemical heat, are generated from the
oxidation reaction mainly from zircaloy and in a lesser extent from stainless steel. Due to slightly
higher steam mass flow rates in case 1n at 7.5 h, both H2 and chemical heat generation are
higher than the rest of the cases (Figure 3.5). Due to energy released from the oxidation reaction
as well as decay heat in the core, combined to the inability of the coolant (steam) to extract so
much energy from the core, integrity of the cladding rod is risked and it is severely degraded.
Being degradation in 7.5 h higher in case 1n than in the other cases, due to a major chemical
heat generation.
As a result, a fraction of core degraded materials relocate in lower levels thus originating partial
flow blockages between the lower plenum and the active core region. Additionally, the channel
box fails and a path is established between the channel and the bypass. In the lower plenum
due to a lower heat transfer (since water is no longer in contact with fuel rods), water keeps
evaporating but in a lesser rate. Due to the blockages, only a small fraction of the steam
generated in the lower plenum is transferred to the active core region.
Since steam is generated at a low rate and only a small fraction of that steam is transferred to
the active core region, pressure within the RPV reaches a semi steady state, in which steam flow
through SRVs is notably reduced. As a result, only a small fraction of the RPV steam inventory
leaks through the SRVs.
At this point, due to cross section differences in flow path connections between control volumes,
a minor fraction of steam flow in the shroud-dome (coming from the channel) enters into the
steam-dome whereas the major fraction enters the bypass. Therefore, steam takes two different
routes from the shroud-dome. As a result, two steam loops are established within the vessel, as
shown in Figure 3.11, which are:
• Loop 1: which involves steam circulation between bypass and channel through the channel
box failure, from the channel to the shroud dome and from there to the bypass again, since
the cross section of the connection between shroud dome and steam dome is fewer than
the connection between shroud dome and bypass.
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• Loop 2: which involves steam circulation through the shroud dome, steam dome, down-
comer and to the shroud dome again.
These two loops arise from the differences between cross sections in connections between channel,
bypass with shroud dome, and between shroud dome and steam dome, being the latter connection
far smaller than that of channel or bypass with the shroud dome. As a result steam flow leaving
the channel enters the shroud dome, where a minor fraction is deviated to the steam dome and
a major fraction is redirected to the bypass where it is transferred to the channel, thus closing
the loop 1. On the other hand, steam entering the steam dome is transferred to the downcomer
where it leaves to the shroud dome, thus making up loop 2. Steam mass flow rate in loop 1 is
far higher than in loop 2, 22 kg/s against 9 kg/s, respectively.
Figure 3.11: Convective steam loops within the RPV.
Once explained steam loops formation within the core, it is worth noting that steam mass flow
rates through the channel are the element which determines the core degradation behavior of all
the cases, as well as the early slump of core materials to the lower plenum in case 1n. Mas flow
rate is defined by the following equation:
Q = v · ρ ·A (3.1)
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Being:
• Q: the steam mass flow rate (kg/s).
• v: the steam velocity (m/s).
• ρ: the steam density (kg/m3).
• A: the cross sectional area (m2).
From 7.5 h on, steam mass flow rate through the channel in case 1n is slightly lower than in
other cases. This fact is produced mainly due to lower steam velocities through the channel,
fact determined by the density gradient between control volumes. As a result, heat extraction
capability of the steam stream is notably reduced for this case, fact that entails a major
degradation of core integrity which results in an early slump to the lower plenum.
3.1.3 Radionuclide evolution
3.1.3.1 Release
Radionuclides in MELCOR are grouped in 17 different classes according to their physicochemical
characteristics, and are referred to as their representative element [6],[8]. The initial inventory
of radionuclides (after reactor shutdown) is estimated by MELCOR from tables coming from
simulations in ORIGEN code [14], according to reactor type and operational power of reactor.
Initial inventories for the reactor object of study are collected in Table A.1, located in Annex A.
In-Vessel early release of noble gases, such as Xe, and high volatile species, such as Cs and CsI,
occurs through fuel-cladding gap release when the cladding failure criterion of 1173 K is reached
(6 h). A small fraction of the core initial inventory (basically the more volatile species) is assumed
to be present in the cladding gap at shutdown, and immediately escapes once failure criterion is
surpassed. From then on, releasing temporal evolution of Xe, Cs and CsI is practically identical
in the sequence and their release is produced sequentially according to phenomenological phases.
In-vessel release of these species from the core mainly follows temperature. In this sequence,
radionuclide releasing phenomena is modeled by means of equations from CORSOR S/V [15],
in which the extent of in-vessel releases depends on the maximum fuel temperature achieved
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during the accident, and the time that fuel stays at a high temperature. Release rate of each
specie strongly relies on temperature, according to the following Arrhenius equation:
f = A · exp(B · T ) (3.2)
Where:
• f: is the release rate (fraction per minute).
• T: is the core cell component temperature (K).
• A, B: constants specified for each specie according to temperature (-).
On the other hand, release of less volatile fission products takes place once the fuel is degraded
enough to allow them to leak to the RCS. Figure 3.12 shows the released fraction of radionuclides
from the core, including those released during the in-vessel phase and those released during the
early ex-vessel phase. In the figure, there are clear the two different behaviors for the volatile
and non-volatile species.
Figure 3.12: Radionuclides released from the core.
It is worth noting that throughout the sequence, all the materials released from initial inventory
Class 4 Halogens, with I as the representative element of the group, is assumed in CsI specie.
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No free iodine exists in the released fission products since there is always an excess of cesium
that combines with any free iodine released.
3.1.3.2 Transport
Radionuclide evolution within the RPV is depicted in Figure 3.13, which shows the total fraction
(deposited and suspended). Despite the fact that the amounts of Xe, Cs and CsI released from the
core are quite similar, retention of these radionuclides in the RPV structures differs significantly
from each other. Major fraction of Cs, is deposited onto the several heat structures within
the vessel, especially in those located in the upper part with large deposition surfaces, such as,
separators, shroud dome and in a lesser extent dryers. On the other hand, CsI leaves the vessel
gradually through the SRVs while being released from the fuel. Fact that points out its higher
volatility than the Cs. This behavior suggests that major part of Cs released is transported
as CsOH, a less volatile specie than CsI, which remains deposited onto RPV heat structures
at relatively high temperatures. CsI, once released, is transported both as vapor and aerosol
species, due to its high vapor pressure. Once reducing conditions, associated to the presence of
H2 produced early ex-vessel oxidation period, vanish the fraction of fuel still remaining in the
RPV is quite degraded. As a result, radionuclides with low vapor pressures, such as Mo, are
able to escape the fuel and deposit in the upper heat structures within the RPV.
Figure 3.13: Total fraction (deposited + airborne) of RN in RPV.
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Radionuclides leaving the RPV during in-vessel, are directed towards the wetwell through
the SRVs. Within the wetwell they are injected in the suppression pool. Pool scrubbing is
modeled by MELCOR based on the SPARC code [8] [11], which automatically scrubs aerosols.
All fission product vapors except elemental iodine would flow through the pool without any
retention. Condensation a the pool entrance, Brownian diffusion, gravitational settling and
inertial impaction in the bubbles are considered by MELCOR [8] [11].
Figure 3.14 depicts radionuclide evolution within the wetwell. In-vessel presence of noble gases
(Xe) and volatile species (Cs, CsI) in the wetwell, increases throughout time while being injected
through SRVs. Injection of CsI and Xe through the SRVs is far more higher than injection of
Cs, since major part of Cs released in the core remains deposited in steam dome structures
within the RPV. When vessel breach and subsequent containment failure takes place (15.26 h),
those species that are suspended in the wetwell atmosphere are transferred to the environment
through the wetwell venting. This is the case for Xe and in a lesser extent for CsI. Cs is almost
completely deposited in the suppression pool, and thus it remains in the wetwell after venting is
open. A significant fraction of CsI is deposited as well in the suppression pool and remains there
during venting to the environment.
Once core debris and molten materials are slumped to the cavity, presence and retention of
volatile species (Cs, CsI, Xe) is enhanced again in the wetwell due to radionuclides coming from
the drywell through the drywell to wetwell vents. Some of them are trapped in the suppression
pool, which is the case of Cs. Furthermore, Xe goes through the suppression pool without any
retention, only a small fraction remains in the wetwell atmosphere, and CsI is mainly retained in
the suppression pool but there is still a fraction remaining in the wetwell atmosphere. Amounts
of the rest of the radionuclide classes present in the wetwell can be considered as unimportant,
given their low fractions.
Retention in the wetwell reaches a semi steady state for Cs and CsI aerosol species, since Cs and
the majority of CsI are retained in the suppression pool. Furthermore, the fraction of CsI in
the wetwell atmosphere does not leak through the drywell to wetwell vents, which is the only
flow path available. Later on fractions of Cs and CsI in the wetwell slightly increase due to the
fall of a fraction of core materials from the active core region to the cavity, at 29 h. Moreover,
the major fraction of noble gases present in the atmosphere of the wetwell eventually leaves it.
Nevertheless, the 6 % of the initial inventory of Xe is retained in the atmosphere of the wetwell.
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All in all, wetwell retention is about 20 % of initial inventory for Cs and 30 % of initial inventory
for CsI.
Figure 3.14: Total fraction (deposited + airborne) of RN in WW.
3.2 Ex-Vessel phase
3.2.1 Thermal-hydraulic evolution
After lower plenum dryout, the temperature of quenched debris increases and metallic debris
begins remelting due to lack of cooling. Thermal attack from particulate and molten debris
causes the rupture of penetration tubes at failure temperature (1273 K). As a result, the molten
corium and particulate debris discharge into the single cavity within the drywell through the
opening at the penetration location. Figure 3.15 shows debris ejection through the penetrations
to the cavity for the 4 cases of study. As shown in the figure, core debris and molten pool ejection
does not occur suddenly, but sequentially according to penetrations failure timings. Additionally,
degraded materials located in the active core region fall to the cavity through the vessel breach
after penetration failure takes place. This figure also shows the extent to which core is degraded
within the RPV as well as the moments when remaining fractions of core materials (located
mainly in third core radial ring) fall into the cavity. Cases without axial stratification (case 1n
and case 8n) appear to have less core degradation according to the mass ejected from the RPV,
that is, a significant fraction of intact fuel remains in the active core, located mainly at lower
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heights in the third radial ring where steam mass flow rates were not so high than in central and
second radial rings.
Figure 3.15: Debris ejected through the breach.
Containment failure takes places right at the time of vessel breach. Temperature and pressure
conditions in the containment trigger head flange and seals failure in the drywell. Additionally
overpressure in the wetwell enables containment venting to the environment.
When RPV breach takes place, there is a sudden transfer of highly energetic gases to the
PCV, fact that entails a dramatic increase in PCV pressure, until a pressure equilibrium is
established between RPV and PCV. Vessel breach also implies a sharp increase in containment
temperature due to presence of significant masses of highly energetic gases, suddenly released
to the containment. Ex-vessel pressure and temperature conditions in the containment can be
seen in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, respectively from the vessel breach on. The high temperatures
and pressures in the PCV, give rise to formation of several leaks to reactor building (secondary
containment) and opening of wetwell venting to the environment. As a result, there is a significant
transfer of gases from the PCV to the secondary containment and to the environment, fact that
entails a dramatic decrease in temperature and pressure within the primary containment.
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After vessel breach, as soon as PCV and environment pressures become equal, wetwell venting
closes and pressure and temperature within PCV start increasing again due to corium ejection
to the cavity. Corium reacts with the concrete of the cavity thus giving rise to the so-called
MCCI (Molten Core-Concrete Interaction), which is characterized by the attack and ablation
to concrete by hot materials in the cavity, and the release of highly energetic gases. Release of
these gases entails an increase in pressure and temperature. Nevertheless, while pressure tends
to decrease, temperature is prone to keep increasing throughout time. Main reason can be found
in flows through the PCV leaks, where gas flows through the leaks are higher than gas release
rates from MCCI.
During the ex-vessel phase, H2 generated inside the vessel leaks to the reactor building through
containment failures. Additionally, H2 is being released to the PCV from the MCCI, and leaks as
well to the reactor building. Within the PCV there is an inert N2 atmosphere, fact that avoids
H2 combustion processes from the H2 accumulated in PCV. Nevertheless, once H2 is released to
reactor building, it meets air and steam concentrations suitable to produce deflagrations, which
take place in the torus room.
Finally, suppression pool temperature is only affected when corium is ejected and there is a
sudden release of energy, which reaches the pool through vent piping thus slightly increasing
temperature.
3.2.2 Molten Core-Concrete Interaction
The corium ejected through the vessel breach is made out of a melt mixture of the constituents
of the core as well as stainless steel structures. These constituents are mainly UO2, ZrO2, Zr,
Fe, Cr and Ni. Melting point of the pure oxides is around 3000 K, while the metals melt at
around 1800 K. The oxides in corium are miscible with each other, but the metallic species are
immiscible with the oxides.
MCCI basically consists on the interaction of the solid concrete and the corium, in particular, of
the attack on the basemat concrete by hot, often molten core materials. The rate of concrete
ablation is mainly controlled by the heat transfer from the melt to the concrete. The attack
of core debris on concrete in LWRs is primarily thermal. Decay heat and heat from chemical
reactions (Equations 3.3, 3.4 [16]), is generated in the corium and is transferred to the control
volume either through its top surface by radiation and convection, or to the concrete floor.
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MELCOR models the effects of heat transfer, concrete ablation, cavity shape change, gas genera-
tion and debris chemistry using models taken from the CORCON-Mod3 code [17]. Furthermore,
VANESA model is integrated into CORCON-Mod3 to calculate the vaporization and release of
melt species into gases that are produced from the decomposition of concrete in the cavity.
Thermal concrete decomposition produces H2O and CO2 that bubble through the pool of molten
materials. On their way to the surface they oxidize metals and turn into H2 and CO, both of
which are combustible gases. The gas motion through corium results in fission product and
aerosol transport to the molten pool surface, from which they can be transferred to the gas
phase, and, hence, increase the potential source to the environment. Total release of combustible
gases throughout the sequence by MCCI are collected in Figures 3.16a and 3.16b, for CO and
H2, respectively. Chemical reactions governing oxidation of Zr within the corium are:
Zr + 2H2O → ZrO2 + 2H2 + 6.3MJ/kgZr (3.3)
Zr + 2CO2 → ZrO2 + 2CO + 5.7MJ/kgZr (3.4)
Once metals (mainly Zr and Fe) present in the corium are completely oxidized, corium composi-
tion changes as well as layer configuration, due to a change in mixture density. When core debris
and molten pool are ejected to the cavity it originates a heavy mixture layer, formed mainly
by heavy oxides and metals. Throughout time, gaseous reactants from the concrete released by
MCCI, flow upwards the corium melt, thus oxidizing mainly Zr and Fe present in the mixture.
This oxidation process is described by means of chemical reactions 3.3 and 3.4. At around 41.4
h, when all Zr and Fe within the mixture are exhausted, species with larger activation energies,
are suddenly oxidized and released to the drywell, and the melt evolves to a light oxide layer.
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(a) CO (b) H2
Figure 3.16: Gases released from the MCCI
Differences in H2 and CO releases from MCCI between the 4 cases of study strongly depends
on the extent to which core has been degraded during the in-vessel phase. Large in-vessel core
degradation means that less Zr is available to be oxidized and generate CO and H2. On the
other hand, those phenomena which implies less overall core degradation, in which integrity
of an important fraction of fuel rod cladding is kept, tend to present less generation of these
combustible gases since Zr remains in its original position and is not available to undergo MCCI.
An example of the latter is the case 1n, whereas a clear example of major core degradation is
case AS 8n.
On the other hand, MCCI strongly depends on concrete composition (Table 2.4) as well as on
heat transfer from the corium. The difference between CO and H2 releases from the cavity to
the drywell has its origins in concrete composition. Particularly, in the concentration of the
gaseous reactants, CO2 and H2O. According to chemical reactions governing MCCI (equations
3.3, 3.4), it is reasonable to obtain such a higher releases of carbon monoxide than hydrogen,
since initial concentration of CO2 is almost five times higher than that for H2O.
Cavity mass evolution throughout the sequence is depicted in figure 3.17. The effects of concrete
ablation and subsequent materials incorporation to the corium as soon as ablation temperature
is reached, are perfectly appreciable from that figure. The increase in mass within the cavity
appreciated at about 30 hours, is due to the fall of remaining core materials in the third core
radial ring.
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Figure 3.17: Cavity mass and temperature evolution.
3.2.3 Radionuclide evolution
3.2.3.1 Release
During the ex-vessel phase, the CORSOR S/V model is responsible to deal only with the late
fission product release inside the RPV. All the releasing phenomena related to the cavity is
modeled in MELCOR by means of equations of VANESA [18]. The VANESA code uses the
time dependent debris pool temperature and gas flow rate predicted by CORCON-Mod3 code to
calculate the fission product and aerosol release rates during MCCI. According to the initial
inventory, ex-vessel fission products release behavior within the cavity is depicted in Figure 3.18.
The release from the cavity comes from the molten fuel, which still contains fractions of initial
inventories of fission products.
VANESA assumes an immediate release of the Xe from the cavity, once corium is slumped, as
well as that total amount of iodine combines with Cs to produce CsI. Initial release of Cs can be
associated to be transported as aerosol suddenly released by the slump and beginning of the
MCCI. Once initial Cs release rate softens, CsI starts being released at the same rate as Cs. Te
release rate increases progressively while zircaloy mass in the corium decreases till it is totally
consumed by oxidation chemical reaction. As a result, corium layer configuration changes at 42
h once Zr and Fe are completely oxidized. This fact allows the oxidation of species with higher
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activation energies such as Mo and Te. This phenomenon has its origins in the massive bubbling
of oxidant gases originated in the MCCI (H2O, CO2) through the debris pool, thus changing
the oxidation potential in the layer, and allowing the release of new formed chemical compounds
which may have higher vapor pressures. Around 90% of the initial inventory of Mo present in
the cavity is oxidized and released as a more volatile specie (probably in oxide or hydroxide
specie). Furthermore, 60 % of the initial inventory of Te present in the cavity is released when
metals (Zr, Fe) are completely oxidized.
Figure 3.18: Radionuclides released from the cavity.
3.2.3.2 Transport
The containment fails immediately after failure of the RPV, since PCV conditions lead to reach
the failure thresholds for the modeled failure modes. Pressure and temperature conditions within
the PCV trigger the failure of the head flange and bellows, whereas containment venting to
the environment is enabled due to high pressure in PCV. Hence the immediate decrease of the
presence of volatile species such as CsI and Xe in the wetwell, especially for the latter (Figure
3.14). Once venting is closed, the high mass flow rate of radionuclides to the environment
vanishes. Due to a sudden release of radioactive gases when corium is slumped to the cavity, a
relatively small amount of radionuclides enter the wetwell through the vents.
Chapter 3. Analysis of the results 46
Barium and Tellurium species leave almost entirely the RPV towards the drywell through the
vessel breach. Within the drywell, whose radionuclide evolution is depicted in Figure 3.19, Cs
and CsI tend to accumulate mainly in the structures that make up the drywell liner as well as
in the internal structures in the drywell. When oxidation of heavy metals (Zr, Fe) by MCCI
ends, oxidation of less volatile species and release of H2O and CO2 originates an increase in the
drywell atmosphere temperature, thus provoking revaporization of a fraction of CsI deposited
onto the drywell internal structures. As a result, a fraction of CsI leaks to reactor building
through the failure paths. Whole Xe fraction in the drywell eventually moves to reactor building.
Almost all the Mo and Te released from MCCI are retained in the DW, except a fraction of Mo
which enters the RPV through the vessel breach and a small fraction of Te which leaks to the
reactor building. Revaporization of Ba within the RPV during early ex-vessel oxidation of core
materials in the third radial ring of the active core region, enhances the transport of Ba to the
drywell through the vessel breach.
Once in the drywell, all species, transported either as vapors or aerosols tend to deposit onto the
drywell liner and internal steel structures, rather than in RPV walls.
Figure 3.19: Total fraction (deposited + airborne) of RN in the DW.
Concerning final release to the environment, depicted in Figure 3.20, high volatile species (such
as Xe, CsI) are mainly released through containment venting as soon as vessel breach takes place.
Immediately after containment venting closure, radionuclide path to the environment consists
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on two stages; a first stage from PCV to the reactor building through the leaks located in the
drywell, and a second stage which comprises the flow from the reactor building to environment,
and occurs through a blowout panel on the roof of the reactor building in the refueling bay
compartment. Less volatile radionuclides are released sequentially through the blowout panel due
to pressure increases produced by gases released from the MCCI entering the reactor building.
It is of special interest the fraction of Cs in the environment. Although it is a volatile specie
which is released from the fuel in significant amounts, fraction reaching the environment is
similar as the one for Ba (which is released in a much lesser fraction). This fact has its origins in
the way it is released and transported throughout the sequence. It is released as aerosol during
in-vessel and retained within the RPV (mainly heat structures) and the suppression pool.
Figure 3.20: Total fraction (deposited + airborne) of RN in the environment.
Finally, a monitoring of the most influent radionuclides during the sequence (Xe, Cs, CsI, Te,
Mo) has been carried out in order to provide a general overview of their behavior.
Xe is transported as a gaseous specie throughout the whole sequence. Xe evolution is depicted in
Figure 3.21. The total fraction of the initial Xe inventory is released from the fuel, and almost
the totality of the released amount eventually reaches the environment. The fraction which does
not reach the environment remains in the PCV, as airborne within the wetwell atmosphere.
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Figure 3.21: Xenon evolution (deposited + airborne) throughout the sequence.
Concerning Cs evolution, which is depicted in Figure 3.22, the degree of the total release is
around 90 % of the initial inventory. Cesium is assumed to be transported as CsOH, mainly as
aerosol (although it is transported in a lesser extent as vapor), which is lately retained in the
walls and structures of the RCS and the PCV. 40 % of the initial inventory is retained in the
RPV, deposited mainly due to sorption and thermophoresis in the separators, dryers and shroud
dome, withstanding high temperatures without being evaporated. On the other hand, in the
containment there are two important deposition locations; one is the drywell, where major part
is deposited in the liner and internal steel structures (20 % of initial inventory), another is the
wetwell, where 20 % of initial inventory is retained as aerosol, in the suppression pool. Only 5 %
of the initial inventory reaches the environment.
Concerning CsI evolution, depicted in Figure 3.23, around 85 % of iodine initial inventory is
released, and instantaneously combined with Cs, to be transported as CsI. This compound is
far more volatile than Cs and shows no retention in the structures within the RPV. During the
in-vessel phase it is mainly transported as vapor, as well as in the ex-vessel phase. Retention in
the PCV accounts the 60 % of the initial inventory, showing a wetwell retention of 30 % of initial
inventory, mainly in the suppression pool but a significant fraction as airborne. On the other
hand, a major fraction of CsI vapor remains as airborne within the drywell atmosphere, and a
minor one deposits onto the walls. CsI airborne present in the drywell, tends to leak towards
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the reactor building when a significant amount of gases are released from MCCI at 42 h. These
gases act as a carrier gas for CsI.
Figure 3.22: Cesium evolution (deposited + airborne) throughout the sequence.
Figure 3.23: Cesium iodide evolution (deposited + airborne) throughout the sequence.
Molybdenum evolution is depicted in Figure 3.24. Ex-vessel Mo release from the core occurs
when fuel remaining in the RPV is significantly degraded. Major part of the released Mo remains
retained in RPV structures and only a small fraction leaks to the PCV. As soon as oxidation
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of Zr and Fe by MCCI in the cavity stops, Mo is completely oxidized and released as aerosol.
Given its low vapor pressure, Mo is released as an aerosol, which is almost completely retained
in the drywell liner. Fraction of Mo remaining as airborne in the drywell is negligible, and a
minor fraction is leaked to the environment through the containment failures.
Figure 3.24: Molybdenum evolution (deposited + airborne) throughout the sequence.
A minor fraction of Te (Figure 3.25) is released during in-vessel. Nevertheless, the major Te
release takes place ex-vessel. Ex-vessel release is produced gradually from the cavity, until a
sharp increase at 42 h coming from a massive release of Te from the cavity in the form of vapor,
as an oxide specie. Major part of the Te released from the cavity is deposited in the drywell (85
% of initial inventory), fact that leads to a low release of Te to the environment. The rest of the
released Te is scattered all over the reactor building and refuel bay. Fraction of Te remaining as
airborne is negligible.
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Figure 3.25: Tellurium evolution (deposited + airborne) throughout the sequence.
Table 3.2 collects the final retention of the main fission products (in fraction of initial inventory)
in the main control volumes at the end of the sequence. This table provides a summary of all
the contents explained above.
Element Released WW DW RPV ENV
Xe 0.99 0.06 4.6 · 10−6 4.6 · 10−6 0.93
Cs 0.89 0.21 0.21 0.41 0.029
I as CsI 0.84 0.29 0.133 0.005 0.17
Mo 0.99 0.016 0.75 0.092 0.012
Te 0.99 0.018 0.84 4.5 · 10−4 0.035
Table 3.2: Final radionuclide retention in main control volumes.
Finally, and taking into account the contribution to the public exposure, a set of isotopes have
been chosen in order to be investigated in terms of activities once released to the environment.
These are depicted in Figure 3.26. Isotopes from the radionuclide classes with large release to
the environment show high activities, especially for the case of I-131, closely followed by Xe-133.
These isotopes mainly have impact in the short-term. On the other hand, special attention must
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be paid to those isotopes with half-lifes of the order of years, such as Cs-137 and Kr-85, which
have impacts in the long-term. Main characteristics of the isotopes are collected in Table B.1.
Figure 3.26: Activities in environment.
3.3 Final core degradation state
In order to better reproduce the extent to which core has been degraded throughout the sequence
in all the cases, Tables 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, provide the intact, and degraded masses distribution
within the core for case 1n, case AS 1n, case 8n, case AS 8n, respectively. They summarize
amounts of fuel as well as major structural and control rod materials, and their distribution
within the core. MELCOR considers intact masses those that are still present in the initial
component located in the original location.
As it can be extracted from the tables below, case 1n is the one in which final core degradation
is less severe, according to fuel and zircaloy intact masses. This fact has its origins in the early
slump of core materials to the lower plenum, fact that dramatically reduces the temperature
in the active core region and thus reduces the generation of chemical heat and H2 through the
oxidation reaction. As a result, the whole third core radial ring remains almost intact.
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On the other hand, case AS 8n is the case which shows the highest final core degradation. One
of the main causes is a higher steam mass flow rate through the channel from 7.5 h on, which
tend to almost completely oxidize the whole amount of fuel located in the active core region.
Material Initial mass Intact mass In core degraded In LP degraded
UO2 80000 20000 0 220
Zr 30000 3042.43 (2634.66
as ZrO2)
160.17 (28.27 as
ZrO2)
1326.45 (98.19 as
ZrO2)
SS 35000 18477.03 0 (919.36 as
SSOX
1)
1326.45 (1476.01
as SSOX)
Table 3.3: Degraded mass distribution case 1n.
Material Initial mass Intact mass In core degraded In LP degraded
UO2 80000 4911.91 60.87 116.09
Zr 30000 294.65 (1116.33 as
ZrO2)
0 (411.255 as
ZrO2)
875.61 (37.69 as
ZrO2)
SS 35000 17169.54 (685.98
as SSOX)
0 (0 as SSOX) 5448.04 (994.83 as
SSOX)
Table 3.4: Degraded mass distribution case AS 1n.
Material Initial mass Intact mass In core degraded In LP degraded
UO2 80000 10652.91 277.28 21.30
Zr 30000 1184.03 (4386.49
as ZrO2)
1441.31 (158.79 as
ZrO2)
309.53 (20.49 as
ZrO2)
SS 35000 17164.4 (692.75 as
SSOX)
0 (0 as SSOX) 5885.34 (1702.80
as SSOX)
Table 3.5: Degraded mass distribution case 8n.
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Material Initial mass Intact mass In core degraded In LP degraded
UO2 80000 3105.33 130.49 63.74
Zr 30000 524.11 (3881.2 as
ZrO2)
1099.85 (4.31 as
ZrO2)
478.46 (30.17 as
ZrO2)
SS 35000 18449.46 (947.51
as SSOX)
222.23 (63.47 as
SSOX)
3499.92 (1705.45
as SSOX)
Table 3.6: Degraded mass distribution case AS 8n.
In all the cases, the final stainless steel intact masses are quite similar, fact that points out that
core plate degradation as well as support and non support structures degradation in the lower
plenum share in a big extent the same behavior.
Notes
1Oxidated stainless steel
Chapter 4
Summary and Conclusions
The presented work studies a SBO sequence in a GE BWR 3 Mark I reactor type, by means of
an analysis of the phenomena involved during the whole sequence related to thermal-hydraulics,
fission product evolution and core degradation. Furthermore, it has been studied the influence
of the wetwell during the progression of the accident. In order to do so, we have worked with
a reference case, and a set of parametric cases have been launched to assess the influence of
the wetwell configuration with either 1 or 8 circumferential nodes. Axial stratification has
been studied as well along the evolution of the accident. Main thermal-hydraulic variables
(pressure, temperature, etc) have been analyzed in both in-vessel and ex-vessel phases. Finally,
an assessment of fission product evolution (release and transport) has been carried out for
the parametric case AS 8n (wetwell with 8 azimuthal nodes and axial stratification), the one
which implies the most severe conditions (all of them imply severe conditions) in terms of core
degradation, and thus in fission product release. The summary and conclusions of the presented
work are shown in the following lines.
At around 5.2 h after the beginning of the accident core uncovery takes place. IC actuation
has kept cooling in the core until it has get depleted. From then on, the lack of a proper core
heat extraction capability triggers a severe core degradation, and an eventual vessel breach
due to RPV penetrations failure in contact with hot debris and molten pool, coming from
materials in the active core. Vessel breach occurs at 14.65 h for the reference case. Nevertheless,
the vessel breach timing slightly varies between parametric cases (depending on the timing of
events). Containment venting and containment failure take place immediately after vessel breach.
The first one occurs due to overpressure in the wetwell, whereas the latter occurs due to high
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temperature and pressure in the PCV, through the bellows and the head flange failure. Severe
core degradation exists in all the cases, being significantly high in the first and second core radial
rings due to higher temperature and steam mass flow rates in these regions.
Hydrogen generation from the oxidation reaction (Zr, Fe) within the vessel rises dramatically
at fuel temperature of 1500 K, eventually reaching 600 kg for the reference case. Hydrogen
generation is higher in the parametric cases, especially in case AS 8n which ends with a cumulative
amount of 900 kg.
When studying the wetwell evolution, those cases with the wetwell modeled with 8 circumferential
nodes, show that the suppression pool is not able to absorb all the latent heat of the steam
coming from the SRVs and due to heat transfer from steam to water, during some periods of
time the water is at the saturation temperature. As a result, a significant amount of steam is
transferred from the wetwell to the drywell. Reactor works with barely heat sink in those periods
of time. One of the main differences between those cases with and without axial stratification, is
the timing of the events. In the first ones these occur faster. Eventually, temperature in the
pressure suppression pool remains slightly below to saturation temperature but slightly below it
in all the cases.
After vessel breach takes place, hot debris and molten materials fall from the lower plenum to
the reactor cavity in the drywell. As a result. corium starts interacting with the concrete in the
cavity, giving rise to the MCCI. This reaction generates significant amounts of the combustible
gases CO and H2, which are transferred to the atmosphere of the drywell. The case in which
those amounts are higher is case AS 1n, in which 11000 kg and 425 kg of CO and H2, respectively,
are generated from the MCCI.
Fission products are released along the progression of the accident. Those radionuclides in which
the released amounts are significantly high during in-vessel, either from intact or molten fuel
within the RPV, are mainly xenon, cesium, iodine (as cesium iodide), molybdenum and tellurium.
During in-vessel, Cs, CsI and Xe are the species with higher released fractions, with releases of
about the 40 % of the initial inventory for all of them, being Te, Mo and Ba released at a lesser
extent (below 5 % of initial inventory). On the other hand, ex-vessel is the period of the sequence
when the major release of radionuclides takes place. From the remaining intact and molten fuel
within the vessel, releases of Xe, Cs and CsI reach cumulative values of 70 %, 66 % and 70 % of
initial inventory, respectively. Radionuclides such as Te, Mo and Ba reach in this stage releasing
values from the RPV of 14 %, 10 % and 10 % of initial inventory, respectively. Additionally,
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releases from the cavity are significant for radionuclides such as Te and Mo, reaching releasing
values of 87 % and 89 % of initial inventory, respectively. Releases from the cavity for Xe, Cs
and CsI are 30 %, 20 % and 10 %, respectively.
After being released, fission products are propagated all over the PCV until containment venting
and containment failure occurs. From then on, they leak the PCV and are transported through
the reactor building to eventually reach the environment, or directly reach the environment
through containment venting. Retention of radionuclides in the wetwell reaches the 20 % and 30
% of the initial inventory for Cs and CsI, respectively. Cs is completely retained as aerosol in the
water, whereas CsI coexist in two phases within the wetwell. A minor fraction of CsI is present
in the wetwell atmosphere as vapor, while the majority of CsI is present in the suppression pool
as aerosol. On the other hand, in the RPV it is retained the 40 % of the initial inventory of
Cs (mainly in the steam dome structures), whereas the drywell shows significant retention of
fission products due to its major size. The 20 % and 12 % of the initial inventory of Cs and CsI
are retained in the drywell mainly settled in the walls. Furthermore, the 75 % and 85 % of the
initial inventory of Mo and Te are retained in the drywell.
The 93 % of the initial inventory of the noble gases leak to the environment, remaining the 6
% present in the atmosphere of the wetwell. Furthermore, and due to its high volatility and
transport as a vapor specie, the 17 % of I leaks the PCV to the environment as CsI, and 2.9 %
of Cs is present likewise in the environment. Given that final amounts in the environment, Xe
and I radioisotopes share a major contribution to the registered activities in the environment.
Overall radionuclide fractions of initial inventory eventually released to the environment are
in agreement with the results obtained in SOARCA [6], for the SBO sequence without RCIC
blackstart actuation. Around the whole fraction of initial inventory of noble gases in the fuel
is released to the environment. Fractions of initial inventory of Cs between the two studies
are quite similar. Nevertheless, presence of iodine in the environment is higher in the present
report, whereas released fractions to the environment of Te and Ba are lower in the present
study. Presence of the rest of radionuclide classes in the environment is closely similar between
both studies.
To conclude, it is important to highlight the formation of partial blockages in the core support
plate due to relocation of degraded and melted materials from the active core. Those blockages
play a fundamental role during in-vessel and strongly affect not only fission product but also
thermal-hydraulic evolution. This topic should undergo further research through sensitivity
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analysis in future works. Nevertheless, in the present report it is beyond the scope of the project.
It is worth noting likewise the role of the release model implemented in the sequence in the
progression of the accident. The comparative study between CORSOR S/V and CORSOR
Booth Low Burn-up (Appendix C ), shows that despite the fact that overall radionuclide released
fractions are quite similar between the two models, the release kinetics of some radionuclides
significantly vary (e.g. Tellurium). This fact arises from the experiments which the models are
based on.
Appendix A
Radionuclide inventory
The following table summarizes the radionuclide core inventory for the generic nuclear power
plant at the time of shutdown. This inventory was estimated by MELCOR by means of tables
carried out by ORIGEN code, according to both type of reactor and operating power of the
reactor. In simple terms, the mass inventory of the different radionuclide classes are normalized
to grams per unit of reactor operating power according to the type of reactor. Hence, the user
only has to define the type of reactor and the operational power of the reactor.
In the present report, these variables are BWR as reactor type and 1400 MWth as operational
power. ORIGEN stores a database for a generic BWR and according to the operating power of
the reactor, MELCOR scales the data to obtain the value of the mass inventory at shutdown.
Additionally, the user have to choose the stage of the fuel cycle in which the reactor is operating.
In the present report, values referred to the end-of-cycle are used.
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Radionuclide
Class Name
Representative
element
Member elements Radioactive
Mass (kg)
Noble Gases Xe He, Ne, Ar, Kr, Xe,
Rn, H, N
179.0
Alkali Metals Cs Li, Na, K, Rb, Cs, Fr,
Cu
103.6
Alkaline Earths Ba Be, Mg, Ca, Sr, Ba,
Ra, Es, Fm
80.1
Halogens I F, Cl, Br, I, At 8.079
Chalcogens Te O, S, Se, Te, Po 15.74
Platinoids Ru Ru, Rh, Pd, Re, Os,
Ir, Pt, Au, Ni
118.5
Early Transition
Elements
Mo V, Cr, Fe, Co, Mn,
Nb, Mo, Tc, Ta, W
135.3
Tetravalent Ce Ti, Zr, Hf, Ce, Th,
Pa, Np, Pu, C
229.2
Trivalents La Gd, Tb, Dy, Ho, Er,
Tm, Yb, Lu, Am,
Cm, Bk, Cf
220.4
Uranium U U 69,400
More Volatile
Main Group
Cd Cd, Hg, Zn, As, Sb,
Pb, Tl, Bi
0.5429
Table A.1: Initial inventory
Appendix B
Isotopes characteristics
In order to provide a general overview of the monitored radioisotopes in the report, Table B.1
gathers the main characteristics of these radioisotopes. From Table B.1 it can be appreciated
those radioisotopes which activities should be considered in the short-term and those whose
activities have to be considered in the long-term.
Isotope Half-life Daughter
Xe-133 5.24 d Cs-133
Kr-85 10.752 y Rb-85
I-131 8.052 d Xe-131
I-133 20.83 h Xe-133
Cs-137 30.08 y Ba-137
Te-129m 33.6 d I-129
Te-131m 33.25 h I-131
Sr-89 50.53 d Y-89
Table B.1: Main characteristics of studied isotopes
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Appendix C
Sensitivity analysis of the releasing
models CORSOR S/V and
CORSOR Booth
An additional set of parametric cases has been launched changing the release model in order
to assess the influence of the model in the fission product evolution. This calculation has been
carried out by means of CORSOR-Booth model for low burn-up. This release model is mainly
based on cesium diffusion behavior experimental results. Release fractions for other classes are
calculated relative to that for cesium by means of scaling factors. The fission products release is
subdivided and controlled by intra-granular diffusion, and is mounted over the results of the
Phebus-FP [19] and the ORNL HI/VI tests [20]. Equations defining radionuclide diffusion
as well as fractional releases depending on intra-granular size are collected in the MELCOR
Reference Manual [11].
Apparently, by comparing both models, CORSOR S/V and CORSOR-Booth, the latter is
supposed to provide more accurate results for those fission products belonging to the more
volatile radionuclide classes, since it is based on Cs kinematics (radionuclide enclosed as volatile
specie). On the other hand, CORSOR-Booth could provide an underestimation of less volatile
radionuclide classes release throughout the sequence for the same reason mentioned above.
Release behavior within the core is depicted in Figure C.1a. Volatile fission products such as Cs,
Xe, Te and CsI have the same release pattern, which is mainly governed by diffusion. Te, which
was barely released from the core with CORSOR S/V is now released at the same order as Cs,
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Xe and CsI. This fact comes from the results obtained from the Phebus tests, which show this
volatile behavior for tellurium. Furthermore, release of mid and low volatile radionuclides from
the core is almost negligible, as appreciated in Figure C.1a.
On the other hand, release of radionuclides from the cavity is depicted in Figure C.1b. In this
Figure, it can be appreciated that fractions of Xe and Cs are released instantaneously after the
corium fall to the cavity. The same behavior was seen with CORSOR S/V (but with different
releasing values). In fact, VANESA is the responsible to model fission product behavior within
the cavity, therefore no significant differences in behavior should appear in the cavity. Once
major fraction of Cs is released in the cavity, its release rate slows down and evolves at the same
rate as CsI release. Te still present in the corium is released gradually showing a release rate
increase throughout time, probably due to a reduction in zircaloy mass by oxidation reaction
consumption. At 46 h all zircaloy and stainless steel are oxidized, and corium layer configuration
changes allowing the oxidation and release of species with high activation energies, such as Te
and Mo.
(a) RPV (b) Cavity
Figure C.1: Radionuclide release
Total radionuclide release, including releases from core and cavity, is shown in Figure C.2.
Volatile fission products are mainly released from the RPV, and in a minor extent from the
cavity. Radionuclides such as Te and Mo show a step at 46 h, as a consequence of a change
in the corium layer configuration due to oxidation of all the Zr and Fe present in the cavity.
Interestingly, noble gases are not completely released from fuel. Fact that suggests that a fraction
of intact fuel still remains in the active core. Surprisingly, Cs release is slightly higher than that
for CsI which has a higher vapor pressure.
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Figure C.2: Cumulative radionuclide release.
Comparing these results with the ones for the CORSOR S/V model, global evolution is the
same for all radionuclides except for Ba. What mostly differs between the two models are the
radionuclide kinetics, especially for Te and in a lesser extent for Mo. Whereas in the COSOR
S/V model only a small fraction of Te is released ex-vessel from the core and the major release
occurs from the cavity at 42 h, in the CORSOR-Booth model, Te is mainly released in-vessel and
only a small fraction occurs ex-vessel suddenly at 46 h. This fact arises from the experiments in
which the model is based, the PHEBUS tests, which pointed out this Te behavior. Concerning
Mo evolution, in CORSOR-Booth model it is only released ex-vessel at 46 h whereas when
modeled with CORSOR S/V, a minor fraction (10 % initial inventory) is released ex-vessel, but
from the core, and the rest is released ex-vessel from the cavity at 42h. Another remarkable
difference is the fraction of Xe reaching the cavity within the corium, three times higher for
CORSOR S/V model. Concerning amount of Cs reaching the cavity in the corium is around the
same order between the two releasing models.
To sum up, final radionuclide release seems not to show remarkable differences between the
two models. Nevertheless, when pointing out radionuclide kinematics, modeling of both models
differs significantly, fact that arises from the tests in which both of them are based.
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